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In the group signature scheme with a trusted party, a verifier can determine
whether or not a signature is made by a member of the group, but cannot identify
the member who signed the signature. In case of dispute later on, the signer can be
identified by the trusted party. However, for efficient group signature schemes proposed
..
so far, removing a member from the group can be not efficiently performed. In this paper,
a group signature scheme with an easy membership canceling is proposed. By sending
a request to use a resource together with the group signature on it to the manager of
the resource, the manager can control anonymous.accesses to the resource. In such an
application, the proposed group signature scheme is suitable for canceling of the access
privilege.
1. INTRODUCTION
The group signature scheme with a trusted party [1] is the signature scheme satisfying the following
conditions:
1. Only members of a group can sign messages.
2. Anyone can determine whether or not a given signature is a valid signature of a member in the group.
But anyone except for the trusted party (and the signer) cannot identify the member who signed from
the signature, and cannot determine whether or not two signatures are made by the same signer.
3. In case of dispute later on, the signer of a signature can be identified by the trusted party.
As an application of the group signature scheme, this paper deals with the access control for the anony-
mous accesses to resources. When a user sends a request to use a resource to the manager of the resource,
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the user sends it together with the group signature on it to the manager. Then, the condition 1 enables the
manager to check that an access. is issued by an approved member. Owing to the condition 2, the accesses are
anonymous. The condition 3 enables the manager to identify a member who made an illegal access with the
help of the trusted party.
The group signature schemes are first proposed by Chaum et al. in [1], and some improved schemes are
proposed in [2, 3], but these schemes have the following drawbacks: The length of the public key of a group
depends on the size of group, and the public key must be modified in adding a new member to the group.
Recently, an efficient group signature scheme which overcomes the problems is proposed in [4]. The idea of the
scheme is that the signature on a message is a non-interactive proof of knowing a membership certificate issued
by a trusted party and that the signature depends on the message. Thus, since the public key of the group is
only a verification key of the certificate, the public key is invariable even if a new member is added. But, the
scheme does not deal with canceling the membership of a member, while the application to the access control
requires the rejection of the further access by a user whose access privilege is canceled. A simple solution is
changing the public key of the group, but unrelated users have loads.
In this paper, a group signature scheme where canceling the membership of a member is easily performed
is proposed. In the scheme, the .loads of unrelated users are not required when canceling is performed.
2. PRELIMINARIES
The proposed group signature scheme is an extension of the scheme in [41. Thus, notations and primitives
in [4] are reviewed. The empty string is denoted as O. For a set A, a ER A means that a is chosen at random
from A. For an integer q, let Zq be the ring of integers modulo q and let Z; be the multiplicative group modulo
q. Let G = (g) be a cyclic group of order n, where 9 is a generator of G. For example, as G, a subgroup of
order n of Z; = {I, ... , r - I} with nlr - 1 can be used. The discrete logarithm of y E G to the base 9 is the
smallest positive integer x satisfying gZ = y. An e-th root of the discrete logarithm of y E G to the base 9 is
an integer x satisfying g{ze) = y, if such an x exists. Note that if the factorization of n is unknown, computing
e-th roots in Z~ is assumed to be infeasible as well as noted in [4].
As a primitive to prove the knowledge of secret values without leaking any useful information on the
secret, the signature of the knowledge is used. That is a non-interactive proof system and a signature on a
message, that is, only one who knows secret values satisfying a statement can COmpute the signature, a verifier
cannot obtain any useful information about the secret values, and an adversary cannot compute an unsigned
message by using signatures of messages chosen by the adversary. One of the signatures of the knowledge
is the signature on a message m of an entity knowing the discrete logarithm x of y, which is basically a
Schnorr signature. The signatures of the knowledge of values satisfying more complex statement can be also
constructed as shown in [4]. Three types of signatures of the knowledge are used to construct the proposed
group signature scheme. The first one is the signature of the knowledge of representations of Yl, ... , Yw to the
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bases gl, ... ,gv on message m, and it is denoted as
It lw
SKREP[(al, ... ,au): (Y1 = IIg:l:li )t\···t\(yw = IIg:~:i)J(m),
j=l j=l
where constants li E {I, v} indicate the number of bases on representation of Yi, the indices eij E {I, ... , u}
refer to the elements aI, , au and the indices bij E {I, ... , v} refer to the elements gl, .. . , gv. For example,
SKREP[(a, fJ) : Y = gel t\ Z = g.8 h"'](m) is the signature on m of an entity knowing the discrete logarithm of
Y to the base 9 and a representation of z to the bases 9 and h, where the h-part of this representation equals
the discrete logarithm of Y to the base g. The second type is the signature of the knowledge of the e-th root
of the discrete logarithm of z to the base 9 on m, and is denoted as
E - SKROOTLOG[fJ: z = g.8"](m).
The third type is the signature of the knowledge of the e-th root of the g-part of a representation of v to the
bases hand 9 on m, and is denoted as
E - SKROOTREP[(T, 8) : v = h"Yl"](m).
For the constructions of these signatures, refer to [4J. Note that E - SKROOTLOG and E - SKROOTREP
are efficient if e is small.
3. A GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME WITH EASY MEMBERSHIP CANCELING
In this section, a group signature scheme where canceling the membership is easily performed is presented.
The participants are members in a group, verifiers who verify the signatures of the members, a group manager
who manages the membership of members in a group, and a trustee who identifies the signer from a signature
and enables canceling of the membership. In [4J, the group manager not only manages the membership but
identifies the signer. But, in this paper, the power is distributed to the group manager and the trustee.
The proposed scheme consists of six parts, system setup, entry into group, signing, verification, identifying
signer from signature and canceling of membership. In the system setup, the setups of keys of participants
are performed. When a person enters the group, the entry into group is used. In the signing, a member
in the group computes his group signature. In case of dispute later on, the trustee identifies the signer in
the identifying signer from signature, and the trustee enables canceling the membership of a member in the
canceling of membership.
System setup: The group manager computes the followings:
• An RSA modulus n and two public exponent e1, e2 > 1,
• Two integers !I, h > 1,
• A cyclic group G = (g) of order n in which computing discrete logarithm the base 9 cannot be computed,
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• An element h E G whose discrete logarithm to base 9 is unknown.
The public key for the group is Y = (n, elJ e2,!t, 12, G, g, h), and the secret key is the factorization of n. Note
that el, e2,!t and 12 must satisfy that solving the congruence !txe1 +12 == ve2 (mod n) is hard. The choices
for el, e2,!t and 12 are discussed in [4].
For each group, the trustee publishes Yn = hP where p En Zn while p is kept secret. Furthermore, the
participants publishes the public key of any digital signature scheme and keeps the corresponding secret key.
Hereafter, except for signing, the values sent from each participant are signed on the digital signature scheme.
Entry into group:
1. A person U who enters a group chooses Xl En Z~ to compute Yl = X~l mod nand Zl = gYl. U sends
the trustee Yl and Zl·
2. The trustee returns U the digital signature, VT, of the trustee on Zl. VT assures that the trustee keeps
3. U chooses X2 En Z~ to compute Y2 = X;l mod nand Z2 = gY2. And U chooses TlJ T2 En Z:, to compute
1iI = T~2(!tYl + h) mod nand 112 = T;2 (!tY2 + h) mod n. U sends the group manager Y-l, 1h. Zl, Z2 and
VT. Furthermore, U proves that they is formed correctly by sending
VI = E-SKROOTLOG[o: : Zl = gae1 ](0),
V2 = E-SKROOTLOG[f3 : gY-l = (z{lgh),8e2](0),
Va = E-SKROOTLOG['Y: Z2 = g1'e1 ](0),
V4 = E-SKROOTLOG[o : gY2 = (z£lgh)6e~](0).
VI proves that Zl is the form of gael for 0: which U knows. V2 proves that yi == f3e2(!to:el +h) (mod n)
for f3 which U knows. Thus, the correctness of 1iI and Zl is assured. Va and V4 are like VI and V2 •
4. Ifl/i, V2, Va, "'4 and VT are correct, the group manager sends U vi = 1iI l / e2 mod nand V2 = 112 l/ e2 mod n.
5. U gets the certificates VI = Vl/Tl = (!tYl + h)1/e2 mod nand V2 = V'2/T2 = (!tY2 + h)1/e2 mod n.
Signing: When a member U signs a massage m, U computes 9 = gr1, £1 = gYl, £2 = hr2 gY2 and d = yli ,
where Tl, T2 En Z~. Furthermore, U computes the following signature of knowledge:
VI = E - SKROOTLOG[o:: ii = gae1 ](m),
V2 = E - SKROOTLOG[f3: £lftgh = g,8e2](m),
Va = E - SKROOTREP[("(, 0) : £2 = h1'le1 ](m),
V4 = E - SKROOTREP[(f,() : £2ftgh = h<g(e2](m),
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lfs = SKREP[(TJ, B) : d = Yk /\ Z2 = hl1l](m).
VI proves that ZI is the form of gOe t for a which U knows. V2 proves that haet + h == f3e 2 (mod n) for f3
which U knows. Va proves that Z2 is the form of h-rlet for I and 8 which U knows. V4 proves that hi == €
(mod n) and h8et + h == (e 2 (mod n) for € and ( which U knows. Vs proves that (z'2, d) is an EIGamal
6"1 -----
encryption on 9 . The signature on m is (g, ZI, Z2, d, VI, V2, Va, V4, \15).
Verification: The verification of the group signature W, ZI, Z2, d, VI, V2, Va, V4, Vs) is the verification of
VI, V2, Va, V, and Vs .
Identifying signer from signature: When it is ordered to identify the signer from a signature (g, ZI, z'2, d,
VI, V2, Va, V4,Vs), the trustee computes Z2= z'2/d1/ p to present i 2 together with
This SKREP proves that Z2 is decrypted into i 2. The group manager searches Z2 identical with i 2 to present
member's signature on Z2, which indicates the signer.
Canceling of membership: When it is ordered to cancel the membership of a member in the group, the
trustee sends verifiers Yl,ZI and Vr of the member. Then, for each signature (g,zl,z'2,d, VI, V2 , Va, 't%t, Vs),
any verifier can check ZI = gYt. If it holds, the signature is made by the member.
4. DISCUSSION
The differences between the proposed scheme and that in [4J are as follows: While the certificate for Y2 is
only issued in the original scheme, the certificate for Yl is also issued and Yl is registered in the trustee in this
scheme. Next, g, ZI, VI and V2 are added to the signature. Finally, the canceling of membership is added. The
newly added part contributes the canceling of the membership as follows. Yl enables verifiers to distinguish
(g, ZI) of a signer whose membership is canceled from others, while (g, ZI) is anonymous if Yl is in secret. The
certificate for Yl, VI and V2 assures that ZI is computed from Yl which is kept by the trustee. Now, the security
of the newly added part is discussed. The unforgeability of the certificates depends on that in the original
because of the sameness of the structures. The anonymity of (g, ZI) holds owing to the following assumption:
For g, z = g8, 9 = gr and z= g8 where r, s ER G, if rand s are unknown, it is infeasible to determine whether
or not the logarithm of z to the base 9 is the same as the logarithm of z to base g. The assumption is based
on, for example, the undeniable signature in [5J. The security of the signatures of the knowledge is based on
those in the original. The group manager and trustee cannot impersonate a valid member since they cannot
know Y2 registered by the member.
By sending a request to use a resource together with the proposed group signature on it to the manager of
the resource, the manager can check that an anonymous access is issued by a user having the access privilege.
And, the manager can check that an anonymous access is issued by a user whose access privilege is canceled
while the anonymity of the other users is not disrupted.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a group signature scheme where canceling the membership is easily performed has been
proposed, which is suitable for the anonymous access control since the further access by a user whose access
privilege is canceled can be rejected.
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